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In her provocative new book, From Widgets to Digits, Professor
Katherine V.W. Stone thoughtfully traces the changes that have occurred in
the American economic system over the past two hundred years and
anticipates those that are likely to occur in the coming years. She discusses
the impact of these transitions on workers, labor organizations, and
employment statutes, and predicts how future employment relationships
will be structured and regulated. This is a scholarly work that should
stimulate the thinking of academics, policy makers, labor leaders, workers,
and anyone else interested in the future rights of working people.

I. SETTING THE STAGE
In Parts I and II of her book, Professor Stone explores employment
arrangements from the 1700s through the present and predicts what future
employment relationships will be like in the digital workplace. In the
formative years in the United States, there were few independent employeremployee relationships. We were an agrarian society in which family
members worked on family farms.' They were often assisted by slaves
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imported from African nations and indentured servants who came from
European countries.2
Merchants operated stores that carried basic needs, and master
craftsmen, journeymen, and apprentices produced needed goods.3 Skilled
artisans enjoyed an independence that distinguished them from modem-day
employees.4 Craft unions codified and protected the relationships between
masters, journeymen, and apprentices. 5 These organizations specified who
could perform skilled work and who could gain entry into apprenticeship
programs. By the late 1800s, mechanization changed the work of artisans,
and skilled masters began to direct the work of less skilled employees. 6
The employment-at-will doctrine was developed by courts to allow
"masters" to terminate "servants" at any time for any reason.7
By the late 1800s, large firms were created to provide railroad services
and to manufacture steel and other mass-produced goods.' Automobile and
steel companies employed semi-skilled and unskilled employees to work
on assembly lines, and they sought to prevent labor unions from organizing
their facilities. 9 People like Frederick Taylor developed scientific
management techniques that were used to structure jobs and to define
employment relationships.'0 Jobs were designed to allow employees to
learn their required tasks quickly, and firms provided the limited training
needed to prepare workers for the functions they would be expected to
perform." Companies were encouraged to provide workers with implicit
promises of continued job security so long as they performed
satisfactorily. 12 Employers provided social welfare benefits through health
insurance and pension programs. 3 These job security arrangements and
fringe benefit plans were
designed to generate worker loyalty and minimize
4
employee turnover.'
In Chapter 3, Professor Stone discusses the development of internal
labor markets in which jobs are arranged within each firm in progression
lines with workers being able to move into higher positions as they obtain
needed experience and training. 5 Employees accepted lower wages at the
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beginning of their employment in exchange for firm-specific training that
would enable them to move into higher progression line positions.
Employees who performed well knew they had secure futures with their
present employers. 16
In Chapter 4, Professor Stone examines the changing nature of
employment.17 By the 1970s, the employment practices of most American
businesses began to change due to both new technologies and globalization.
Manufacturing facilities were being automated, causing the layoff of
millions of production workers. Companies were no longer competing on a
domestic level. They had to compete with multinational enterprises manufacturing goods or providing services through facilities in low wage
countries like Mexico, China, India, and Ireland. To make themselves
more competitive, United States firms demanded more flexibility. They
increased their use of temporary workers provided by entities such as
Manpower, Inc. 8 Companies maintained core groups of long-term
employees and part-time employees, and used "permatemps" to fill in
where needed. 9
The implicit psychological contract guaranteeing employees job
security in exchange for firm loyalty was eroded by the layoff of thousands
of workers from one company after another. Job tenure with particular
firms declined, as employees were forced to move from company to
company as old positions were closed out and new positions were created.20
Although most state courts created a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine which prevented the discharge of workers for
reasons that contravened significant public policies, few rank-and-file
employees benefited from this exception.2 1
In Chapter 5, Professor Stone explores the new employment
relationships that have evolved. Few workers will remain for many years
with one firm. They will instead move from one company to another as
they maintain "boundaryless careers.' 22 New implicit psychological
employment contracts are developing. Gone is the former commitment to
continued employment in exchange for employee loyalty. 23 The more
stable firms of the past are being replaced by "competency-based
organizations" in which employees are rewarded with performance-based
compensation and provided with career training that will enhance their
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mobility.24 Individuals will change jobs frequently throughout their
careers, using their portable skills to maintain their employability.
Skilled employees will work in environments that use self-managed
teams, Total Quality Management (TQM) arrangements, quality circles,
and similar programs to enhance productivity and quality.25
Such
arrangements will presumably enable workers to share ideas with each
other, provide them with greater job flexibility, and enhance their mobility
as existing positions are closed out and they are forced to seek new job
opportunities. Firms hope that their workers will be sufficiently satisfied
with their shorter-term relationships that they will no longer perceive any
need for unionization.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF NEW JOB ARRANGEMENTS FOR LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW

In Part III, Professor Stone examines the impact of new employment
relationships on existing labor and employment law doctrines. She initially
focuses on the National Labor Relations Act and the viability of collective
bargaining relationships in a digital world.26 Traditional labor law was
developed during the industrial era, and it reflects the long-term
employment relationships created during that period."
Other federal
enactments established minimal wage and overtime rules and occupational
safety and health standards designed to protect individuals not covered by
more expansive bargaining agreement guarantees.28 These statutes have
done well to provide minimal protections to individuals in conventional
work environments, but they may not function as effectively in work
environments of the twenty-first century.
As firms provide specific training and share trade secrets with
employees expected to move on to other companies in the coming years,
disputes will increasingly arise over the ownership of the human capital
obtained with each employer. 29 Employees may reasonably think that they
should be able to take most knowledge acquired in previous positions to
new employment settings, but employers are increasingly requiring
workers to accept covenants not to disclose confidential information to
other firms and not to work for competitor organizations for specified
periods of time.3 ° Professor Stone examines the way such confidentiality
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and non-compete restrictions should be applied in modem employment
settings. She explains the unfairness of imposing covenants not to compete
upon at-will employees who have minimal bargaining power due to their
lack of employment options. 3 Although courts tend to enforce reasonable
non-compete covenants, Professor Stone suggests that such provisions
should be limited both in terms of their duration and geographic scope.32
She believes that technologically advanced employer interests can be
effectively protected through provisions precluding the disclosure of trade
secrets and other confidential firm information such as customer lists and
customer needs.33 When companies provide confidential firm-specific
training, restrictions on the subsequent use of such knowledge may be
appropriate, while restrictions on the use of more general training
knowledge would not.'
Professor Stone also discusses whether firms should be able to seek
reimbursement for worker training provided at company expense from
employees who depart prematurely.35 Although it is not always easy to
know who paid for the training, since individuals may accept lower salaries
in exchange for firm-provided training, Professor Stone proposes that firms
be allowed to recover the reasonable cost of firm-provided training where
employees have agreed to such reimbursement if they leave before their
employers have recouped the costs of such training.36
As employment relationships continue to change, it may become more
difficult for courts to enforce the different civil rights laws.37 These laws
were primarily designed to preclude discrimination within internal labor
markets, as firms hired individuals and advanced them through company
progression lines.38 Many firms had overtly preferred white males over
women and minorities, and Congress had sought to reverse this trend. It
was usually easy to determine who decided the people to be hired or
promoted, thus enabling courts to assign culpability for discriminatory
decisions.
It will be more difficult to assign responsibility for discrimination in
the boundaryless workplace due to more diffused and less visible decisionmaking authority.3 9 Twenty-first century firms will have less defined
progression lines, making it difficult to monitor "promotional" deter-
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minations. 4 As groups of working professionals decide among themselves
how to divide up work responsibilities, patronage systems may develop that
promote the interests of white males." Where multi-component hiring and
work assignment systems are used, it will be difficult for individual
claimants to satisfy their burden to demonstrate which component caused
the discriminatory results being challenged.42 When workers are harassed
by their peers in firms with diffused managerial authority, it will be hard
for the harassment victims to establish that firm managers knew about their
situations and failed to take appropriate corrective action.4 3
Toward the end of Chapter 8, Professor Stone explores new concepts
of liability that might be employed to regulate discrimination in the
She suggests that internal dispute resolution
boundaryless workplace.'
systems that use mediation and private arbitration may be more effective
than external judicial procedures, since they could more easily discern and
rectify subtler forms of discrimination. 45 She also explores the efficacy of
employment discrimination laws in other countries that require firms to
affirmatively review their established practices on a regular basis to be sure
they are operating on a nondiscriminatory basis.46
III. COLLECTIVE WORKER RIGHTS IN THE BOUNDARYLESS WORKPLACE

In Chapters 8 and 9, Professor Stone covers unionism and employee
representation in the boundaryless workplace. She suggests that it will be
more difficult for labor organizations to exist in diffused digital
employment environments, but believes that such worker institutions are an
essential element of industrial democracy.4 7 She notes the recent study by
Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers finding that eighty-seven
percent of American workers would like some form of representation, but
48
would prefer to have less adversarial labor-management relationships.
She cites other experts indicating how labor organizations could function
within boundaryless employment environments to enhance employee
performance.4 9 Unions would have to give up the rigid rules associated
with antiquated seniority systems and specific job classifications, and
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provide firms with greater job flexibility than has been provided in
traditional trade union bargaining agreements.5 0
Existing NLRA policies would have to change if labor organizations5
are to function efficiently within contemporary employment settings. '
Bargaining units would have to be redefined to include diverse workers
from the primary employer and from external temporary employment
agencies.52 Rules restricting secondary union activity would also have to
be modified to recognize the difficulty of differentiating between "primary"
and "secondary" parties where indirect firm relationships are involved. 3
Even doctrines defining traditional employer-employee relationships would
have to be altered to reflect the more complicated relationships associated
with boundaryless employment environments.5 "
In Chapter 10, Professor Stone discusses what labor organizations will
have to do if they hope to survive in the digital age. They will have to
develop new methods of operation and become more active in the political
process.56 Craft organizations may have to expand their jurisdictions to
include more expansive groups of employees who work together in modern
industries. 7 Professor Stone cites the National Association of Broadcast
Employees and Technicians (NABET), which has organized theatrical craft
workers on an industrial union basis, and the International Alliance of
Theatrical and Stage Employees (IATSE), which has accomplished similar
results with respect to film crews.58 The Service Employees International
Union (SEIU) has used similar tactics in its Justice for Janitors campaign to
organize the janitorial positions in high-rise office buildings with building
owners to cover the employees of any firm providing janitorial services
within the covered buildings.59
By expanding their jurisdictional limits and seeking industry-wide
protections, either locally or nationally, labor organizations could reach
more employees and define employment terms more expansively. Unions
must recognize that in the twenty-first century labor force, they need to
seek portable training rights, child care for parents with young children,
and movable pension plans and provide legal assistance to individuals
seeking to enforce labor and employment laws. 60 They must also function
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as "citizen unions" to work with public interest groups and special interest
groups (e.g., NAACP, MALDEF, 9to5) to further worker rights generally,
even for those not formally represented in bargaining units. 6'
IV. SOCIETAL JUSTICE IN THE DIGITAL ERA

In Part IV of her book, Professor Stone examines the implications
associated with the demise of the private welfare system (Chapter 11) and
the expanding gulf between the rich and the poor in the U.S. (Chapter 12).
As worker mobility increases, health coverage and pension issues arise,
causing employees to lose coverage for pre-existing medical conditions and
forfeit unvested pension rights.6 a Professor Stone suggests that health care
plans be modified to make them more portable. Employers might establish
defined contribution programs in which they provide employees with
premiums they can use to purchase health care they can retain as they move
from firm to firm. 63 She also mentions possible legislative changes that

would provide workers with similar health care portability. 64 As employers
have been moving from defined benefit to defined contribution pension
plans, employees have obtained greater portability, since they can roll over
funds from one plan to another as they relocate.65
In the last chapter, Professor Stone tackles a social issue inherent in
our movement toward a post-industrial economy - the growing gap
between the rich and the poor. She notes how the income earned by
individuals in the top decile has increased, while the earnings of lower
groups have declined in recent years.66 As we move away from internal
labor markets in which firms retained set differentials between more skilled
and less skilled jobs to external labor markets in which different firms may
pay vastly different salaries for similar. work, the gap between highly
skilled people and less skilled individuals has grown.67 Globalization has
exacerbated the problem as higher-wage jobs have been exported to lowerwage countries, and displaced American workers have had to accept lowerpaying service sector positions.68 To offset the impact of decreasing real
earnings for lower-income workers, Professor Stone proposes an increase
in the minimum wage and the expansion of the earned income tax credit,
wage subsidies, and similar options. 69 She also recommends publicly
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financed training programs and government sponsored child care.7 °
V. DISCUSSION

From Widgets to Digits is a book filled with diverse ideas relevant to
the rapidly changing world of work. Professor Stone does an excellent job
of raising the issues associated with our transition from an industrial to a
post-industrial economy. Millions of middle-class manufacturing jobs have
been replaced by technology within existing plants and lower-wage labor in
developing countries through outsourcing. Displaced employees have been
forced into lower-wage service sector jobs that tend to provide less
generous health care and pension coverage. As a result, the gap between
the wealthy and the less wealthy has grown substantially.7' It is not
entirely coincidental that these economic changes have occurred while
membership in labor organizations has declined.
The decline in unionization over the past half-century has had a
significant impact. With the industrial revolution of the first half of the
twentieth century and the formation of industrial unions like the United
Automobile Workers, the United Steelworkers, and the International Union
of Electrical Workers, the major manufacturing firms were organized and
representative unions negotiated generous wage rates and fringe benefits.72
By the late 1950s, thirty-five percent of private sector workers were union
members. 73 Even unorganized employees benefited indirectly from the fact
their employers maintained generous employment conditions in an effort to
avoid unionization. During the hyper-inflation of the 1970s, caused in
large part by increased oil prices, the union wage premium rose unusually
fast due to cost-of-living clauses in bargaining agreements. The wages of
organized personnel increased more rapidly than those of their unorganized
counterparts. As a result, American firms began to work more diligently to
avoid unions and to eliminate incumbent labor organizations.
By 1980, the union density rate had fallen to twenty-three percent.74
Since then, the union membership rate declined more rapidly, falling to 7.9
percent today. 75 As union membership has shrunk and employers no longer
fear unionization, the real wages of regular workers have stagnated while

70. Id. at 283-285.
71. See Century Foundation, The New American Economy: A Rising Tide that Lifts
Only Yachts (2004), at http://www.tcf.org/Publications/Economicslnequality/wasowyachtrc.pdf.
72. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 48, at 43-77.
73. See MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED
STATES 10, tbl. 1 (1987).
74. CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? 35 (1993).
75. See Daily Labor Report (B.N.A.) No. 18, at AA-1 (Jan. 28, 2005).
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the wealth of managers and shareholders has grown.76 For example, the
CEOs of major corporations who earned about forty times the average
earnings of regular workers forty-five years ago 77 now earn 475 times
average employee salaries. 8 Shareholder wealth has similarly risen as the
Dow Jones average has increased from below 1,000 in 198079 to over
10,000 today. 0
As Professor Stone points out, the NLRA has not kept pace with the
dramatic changes occurring within the U.S. economy. When the NLRA
was enacted in 1935, it was designed for skilled craft workers who were
already well organized and industrial facilities that were expeditiously
organized by CIO unions as a result of their new-found legal rights. The
NLRA was significantly amended in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act and in
1959 by the Landrum-Griffin Act, but it has remained unchanged for fortysix years.8" As a result, it no longer reflects the contemporary economy,
and the anemic remedial provisions in that statute make it easy for
employers to deny their employees the basic associational rights guaranteed
under international human rights conventions. 2
Professor Stone is correct in assuming that the NLRA is unlikely to be
amended in ways designed to make union organizing easier. She thus notes
the need for unions to reinvent themselves. They need to work more
closely with special interest groups like the NAACP and 9to58 3 to become
even more politically and legally active. They must move into the twentyfirst century and use Internet channels to generate worker solidarity. 8 In
addition, unions should support the enactment of federal and state
legislation that would benefit all workers. This would include increases in
minimum wage laws, efforts to cover the forty-five million Americans with
no health coverage, laws to better protect pension rights, more generous
76. See Charles B. Craver, The American Worker: JuniorPartnerin Success and Senior
Partnerin Failure,37 U.S.F. L. REV. 587, 587-88 (2003).
77. ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 7 (1991).

78. Jennifer Reingold, Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 17, 2000, at 110.
79. Dow Jones Indexes, Dow Data 1980-1989, at http://djindexes.com/mdsidx/
downloads/1980-1989.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
80. Andrew Caffrey, Dow's March Upward Is a Low-Key Trip, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
13, 2005, at El.
81. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossificationof American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv.

1527, 1532-33 (2002).
82. See generally LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS

(2004); see also Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to
PreserveIndustrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 397 (1992).
83. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks": Privilege and the
United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1542, 1617-18 (1999) (discussing how 9to5,

the National Association for Working Women, supports the labor movement).
84. See generally ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK, CYBERUNION: EMPOWERING LABOR THROUGH
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY (1999).
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family and medical leave provisions, government-sponsored child care, and
similar laws. These efforts would demonstrate the unions' commitment to
the advancement of the rights of all workers and induce employees to
appreciate the benefits that can be obtained through collective action.
Although some people think that labor organizations are antiquated
institutions no longer needed in our advanced society, it is clear from
Professor Stone's book that this assumption is erroneous.85 Nonetheless,
she understates the degree to which unions influenced the development of
the former psychological contract that provided employees with continued
job security by failing to emphasize that this commitment was not entirely
voluntary. The unions that by the late 1950s represented thirty five percent
of private sector workerss6 negotiated just cause provisions that precluded
unjust discipline, seniority plans guaranteeing job security to long-term
employees, and grievance-arbitration procedures that could be used to
enforce those contractual guarantees. Even nonunion firms tended to adopt
similar schemes if only to discourage their own workers from unionizing.
Employees enjoyed more expansive rights and a higher standard of living
than any time in U.S. history, because of the successful efforts of
representative labor organizations.
Regular workers intuitively appreciate the need for continued
collective activities if they are to advance their employment interests in the
coming years. Professor Stone cites the work of Professors Richard
Freeman and Joel Rogers indicating that most employees would still prefer
some form of representation.8 7 They recognize that the master-servant
doctrine is still operative and appreciate the fact that individual employees
have no bargaining power vis-a-vis their corporate employers. On the
other hand, they would prefer less adversarial labor-management
relationships. 8 If only Congress could amend the NLRA to make that act
less adversarial and encourage more cooperative bargaining relationships.
It could also require members-only bargaining which would authorize
unions that do not have majority support to negotiate on behalf of their
actual members.89
The NLRA should be modified to expand the definition of
"employee" set forth in section 2(3).90 The "economic realities" test
85. See Charles B. Craver, Why Labor Unions Must [and Can]Survive, 1 U. PA.

J. LAB.
HOYT N. WHEELER, THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT (2002); CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? (1993).

& EMP. L. 15 (1998). See generally

86. See supra text accompanying note 73.
87. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 48, at 146-148.
88. See id. at 56-60.
89. See generally CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK (2005) (discussing
the historical use of members-only bargaining and arguing that the existing NLRA actually
requires employers to negotiate with minority labor organizations on a members-only basis).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000).
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articulated by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.9'
should be incorporated to extend statutory coverage to such atypical
workers as independent contractors with close relationships with particular
and permatemps obtained from external employment
employers,
9
agencies. 2 Bargaining units should be redefined to allow the inclusion of

such diverse groups of workers within single units, in recognition of the
fact that they really do share communities of interest vis-a-vis the firms
using their services.93

Congress could alternatively pass a mandatory worker participation
law that would require larger firms to establish shop-level committees
consisting of employee and manager representatives that would have to be
consulted before decisions are made that would significantly affect the
employment terms of workers.94 Employees should also be allowed to
elect some members of corporate boards, and all board members should
owe a fiduciary duty to the individuals who produce the goods or provide
the services that enable business firms to be successful. As labor
organizations have declined and managers and shareholders have
prospered, business leaders have forgotten the crucial contributions
provided by regular workers.
Just as Professor Stone has overly romanticized the prior
psychological contract by assuming that most employers provided workers
with continued job security due to altruistic considerations, she overly
romanticizes the degree to which contemporary employers are committed
to the new psychological contract. Neither widget producers nor digital
firms have taken care of their employees out of a sense of firm loyalty.
They have continued to treat their workers no better than widgets and
digits. Employers take care of employees to the minimal extent necessary
to guarantee a continued supply of qualified labor. They do not provide
employees with training opportunities to enhance their future portability,
but only to ensure their capacity to perform their present job functions.
Whenever possible, modem companies provide firm-specific training that
is not easily taken elsewhere. When they do provide more generic training,
they endeavor to restrict the ability of workers to use that training in other
91. 322U.S. 111, 127-128 (1944).
92. See Craver, supra note 82, at 417-418.
93. The Labor Board accomplished this objective in M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B.
1298 (2000), in which it held that bargaining units could include both permanent employees
and employees supplied through employment agencies. However, in Oakwood Care
Center, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 176 L.R.R.M. 1033 (2004), it overruled M.B. Sturgis and held
that such mixed units would only be allowed where both the regular employers and the
temporary agencies consented.
94. See Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker Participationis Required in a Declining
Union Environment to Provide Employees with Meaningful IndustrialDemocracy, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 135 (1997).
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settings after they leave their current employers. They do this, as Professor
Stone indicates, through trade secret disclosure restrictions and noncompete covenants. These limitations contravene the implicit contract
Professor Stone suggests is indigenous to digital workplace employment
arrangements in which employees give up firm-specific job security in
exchange for greater mobility.
If digital corporations are to honor the new psychological contract
described by Professor Stone, they should limit their trade secret disclosure
restrictions to critical company secrets they have the right to protect. In
addition, non-competition covenants should be restricted, as Professor
Stone suggests, in terms of both their scope and duration. It is interesting
to note that the State of California prohibits the enforcement of noncompete covenants, 95 yet this fact has not dampened the innovative work
carried out in Silicon Valley and in other California communities.
Near the end of her book, Professor Stone suggests that it will be more
difficult for federal and state civil rights agencies to enforce employment
discrimination statutes in digital workplaces due to the diffused managerial
authority involved. Who should be liable for discriminatory decisions
made by individuals within autonomous work groups? Which firms should
be held responsible for discrimination by borrowing firms against
permatemp workers originally hired by temporary employment agencies?
Which companies should be required to rectify sexual harassment by
permanent workers against temporary personnel? Although these questions
raise interesting issues, agencies should be able to resolve them under
existing legal doctrines by focusing on the persons managing the
employees at the time of the alleged discrimination or acts of harassment.
Companies that establish autonomous work groups to perform business
functions should be expected to monitor the decisions being made by such
teams and be held accountable for any discriminatory practices carried out
by such entities. If the borrowing firm discriminates against temporary
workers, it should be held liable. If the loaning firm tolerated this
discriminatory action, it should also be held responsible. When unlawful
harassment occurs, enforcing agencies should ask which company was
responsible for management of the work environment at the time the
harassing conduct took place. In some cases a single company may be held
liable, while in other situations two or even three businesses may be held
jointly responsible.

95. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600, which has been interpreted to invalidate
agreements that limit the right of former employees to work for competing firms. See, e.g.,
John F. Matull & Assoc., Inc. v. Cloutier, 240 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1987) (dealing with a noncompete covenant).
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VII. CONCLUSION

From Widgets to Digits is a book that will stimulate the thinking of all
persons concerned with the rights of twenty-first century workers.
Professor Stone has cogently described the difficulties employees and labor
organizations are encountering in our post-industrial society. She has also
delineated some of the policy changes that will have to be made if working
people are to benefit from the fruits of their labors in the coming decades.
Only time will tell whether business and political leaders will continue to
erode fundamental worker rights or adopt new policies that will enable
employees to share in the wealth they help generate.

